University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications, Department of History

History, Department of

Winter 1991

Weimar Culture and the Rise of National Socialism: The
Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur
Alan E. Steinweis
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, asteinweis1@unl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historyfacpub
Part of the History Commons

Steinweis, Alan E., "Weimar Culture and the Rise of National Socialism: The Kampfbund für deutsche
Kultur" (1991). Faculty Publications, Department of History. 79.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/historyfacpub/79

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History, Department of at DigitalCommons@University
of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, Department of History by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Published in Central European History, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1991), pp. 402-423.
Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Conference Group for Central
European History of the American Historical Association. Used by permission.

Weimar Culture and the Rise
of National Socialism:
The Kampfbund fiir deutsche Kultur
Alan E. Steinweis

B

ETWEEN 1928 and 1932, the National Socialist movement transformed itself from an insurgent fringe party into Germany's most
potent political force. The most important factor in this dramatic
turnabout in political fortunes was the rapid deterioration of the German
economy beginning in 1929. It does not, however, logically follow that
the German people simply fell into the lap of the party and its charismatic
leader. T o the contrary, the party aggressively employed sophisticated
propagandistic and organizational strategies for attracting and mobilizing
diverse segments of German society. With the onset of the economic
crisis, and the consequent social and political turmoil, the party stood
ready to receive, organize, and mobilize Germans from all social strata.'
Cultural issues featured prominently in propaganda, particularly in the
latter, decisive phase of the Nazis' rise to power. After its breakthrough
in the September 1930 Reichstag elections, the NSDAP wasted little time
before going on a cultural offensive. In December 1930, for example,
provocations in Berlin achieved a major symbolic victory, compelling
the government to ban the film version of Remarque's All Quiet on the
Western Front.' Despite such successes, the movement's reliance on artisFO; their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, the author would like to thank
Geoffrey Giles, Wolfgang Natter, William S. Allen, and the participants in the facultygraduate student colloquium of the Department of History, Florida State University.

1. For background on the mobilization of various German constituencies, I have relied
on the following works: Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Projle of Members and
Leaders, 1919-1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1983); Thomas Chiiders, The Nazi Voter: The Social
Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, 1983); Detlef Miihlberger,
Hitler's Followers: Studies in the Sociology of the Movement (London, 1991); and Jiirgen W.
Falter, Hitlers Wahler (Munich, 1991). An insightful treatment of the importance of propaganda to mobilization strategies is Ian Kershaw, "Ideology, Propaganda, and the Rise of
the Party," in Peter D. Stachura, ed., The Machtergreifung (London, 1983), 162-81.
2. For a discussion of this episode in the context of political strategy, see Martin Broszat,
Hitler and the Collapse of Weimar Germany, trans. V . R. Berghahn (Leamington Spa, 1984).
32-36.
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tic and cultural strategies during its rise to power has not been subjected
to rigorous analysis. Although several studies have examined the cultural
policies implemented by the Nazis once in power, the historiography is
deficient when it comes to the role of cultural politics in pre-1933
mobilization strategies. Ironically, the use of art and culture as a political
weapon by the left-wing parties has generated far more scholarly
intere~t.~
At the tinie of the seizure of power, the Kampfbundflr deutsche Kultur
functioned as the movement's primary vehicle for cultural and artistic
mobilization. Yet little is known about this organization. Although the
Kampfbund forms the focus of a chapter in Reinhard Bollmus's authoritative study of Alfred Rosenberg's career in the movement, Bollmus
concentrates primarily on the role of the Kampfbund in the Byzantine
jurisdictional conflicts of the Third R e i ~ h In
. ~ contrast, Bollmus says
relatively little about the Kampfbund's contribution to the growth and
popularity of the movement before 1933. Several recent turns in the
historiography of the Weimar Republic and pre-1933 National Socialism
would now make a fresh look at the Kampfbund particularly worthwhile.
There has been a renewal of interest in the importance of broad cultural,
as opposed to strictly socioeconomic, factors in the weakening of
Weimar democracy and the success of N a z i ~ mAlso
. ~ increasingly prevalent have been studies investigating the social, rather than the purely
political, mechanisms through which the volkische worldview was disseminated among the German p ~ p u l a t i o nThe
. ~ Kampfbund constitutes
3. For a recent example see W. L. Guttsman, Workers' Culture in Weimar Germany:
Between Tradition and Commitment (New York, 1990).
4. Reinhard Bollmus, Das Amt Rosenberg und seine Gegner: Studien zum Machtkampf im
~tiom~sozialistischen
Henschaftssystem (Stuttgart, 1970), 27-54. An earlier study s d valuable
for its detailed treatment of organizational and financial questions is Herbert P. Rothfeder,
"A Study of Alfred Rosenberg's Organization for National Socialist Ideology" (Ph.D.
diss., University of Michigan, 1963), 29-54. The classic study by Hildegard Brenner, Die
Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus (Reinbek, 1963) is useful for context, but on issues
related to the Kampfbund has been supplanted by Bollmus. Particularly insightful on the
Kampfbund's activities in the sphere of architecture is Barbara Miller Lane, Architecture and
Politics in Germany, 1918-1945 (Cambridge, MA, 1968), 148-60. Fred K. Prieberg, Musik
im NS-Staat (Frankfurt, 1982). 3640, provides a useful sketch of Kampfaund activities in the
music field.
5. See Modris Eksteins, The Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modem Age
(Boston. 1989): Detlev, I. K. Peukert, "The Weirnar Republic--Old and new Perspectives,"
~ e r m a n ~ i s t o 6& (1986: 133- -+ Thomas Childers, he Social Language of Politics in
Germany: The Sociology of Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic," American Historical Review 95 (April 1990): 331-58; Larry Eugene Jones, "Culture and Politics in the
Weimar Republic," in Gordon Martel, ed., Modern Germany Reconsidered (London, 1991).
6. Rudy Koshar, Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism: Marburg 188G193.5 (Chapel Hi,
1986); Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar
Germany (New York, 1990).
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an excellent case study of how artistic and cultural activism shaped the
Nazi movement's public image during the later stages of the "time of
struggle," helping to pave the party's path to social respectability among
the propertied and educated middle class (Besitz und Bildungsburgertum).
The origins of the KampJbund must be understood in two broader
contexts: that of the cultural politics of the Weimar Republic, and that of
the mobilization strategies employed by the National Socialist
movement.' Conflict between tradition and experimentation on the
artistic scene reflected the profound social and ideological cleavages of
Weimar Germany. The efflorescence of artistic modernism after World
War I had coincided with a profound shake-up of the social relationships
and economic structures that had prevailed before the war. Thus, to
many Germans, artistic modernism exacerbated a more fundamental
disorientation. Believing the proper function of art to be a lifting of the
spirit through an emphasis on beauty and heroism, the critics of modernism condemned forms of art conceived as means for exploring new
perspectives on reality and for bringing society's blemishes into sharper
focus. They believed that Germany had lost its traditional bearings, and
that the new art functioned as a critical and corrosive force, promoting
the unraveling of the social fabric by questioning the legitimacy of
prevailing attitudes and institutions. Cultural anxiety manifested itself in
many forms and across a wide political spectrum.' O n the extreme
Right, it often assumed the form of conspiracy theory: the threat to
traditional German culture was said to emanate from a network of
racially, spiritually, and even financially interconnected artistic and
cultural movements, led by Jews and Marxists, promoted by feminists,
and most conspicuously symbolized by the increasing visibility of "Negroes" on the art scene.
Among Germans professionally involved in the arts, modernism could
represent more than an affront to prevailing sensibilities. It could also
pose a personal threat to artists who understood themselves to be the
guardians of tradition, a role in which many took a good deal of pride,
and for which several received handsome financial compensation. Para7. Surveys on artistic and cultural trends in Weimar Germany include Peter Gay, Weimar
Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York, 1968); Walter Laqueur. Weimar: A Cultural
History (New York, 1974);Jost Hermand and Frank Trommler, Die Kultur der Weimarer
Republik (Munich, 1978). Gary Stark, Entrepreneurs of Ideology: Neoconservative Publishers in
Weimar Germany (Chapel Hill, 1981) also contains much useful material on cultural issues.
8. I have attempted elsewhere to compare and contrast the Nazi artistic and cultural
critique with those of other parties of the Weimar Right. See Alan E. Steinweis, "Conservatism, National Socialism, and the Cultural Crisis of the Weimar Republic," in Larry
Eugene Jones and James Retallack, eds., Between Reform, Reaction and Resistance: Studies in
the History of German Conservatismfrom 1789 to 1945 (New York, 1992).

doxically, the financially unsuccessful could conveniently blame their
professional misfortunes on the new trends. The new art, they argued,
dismissed the relevance of the taste and skills that they had been taught to
cultivate, substituting instead an excessive emphasis on intellectual abstractions and political content. Furthermore, they contended, the new
art had scared many average Germans away from galleries, theaters, and
concert halls. German artists faced starvation, they argued, because
German art had been uprooted from its nurturing soil, the p e ~ p l eBy
.~
1932, the pool of unemployed artists in which such notions could take
hold was enormous.1°
The Kampfbund set forth as one of its paramount goals the need to
educate Germans about the intimate connection between cultural decay
and national decline. As the inaugural issue of the Kampfbund's newsletter
explained, the "political and economic collapse of Germany" after the
Great War had been "more than a merely external event." Rather, "it
was only the metaphor for an inner lack of belief in the value of Germandom." Similarly, the chaos of Weimar politics merely signified a more
fundamental malaise rooted in the "absence of a universally popular state
and cultural ideal." The Kampfbund's founders conceived its mission as
one of volkisch consciousness-raising. It was to "defend the value of the
German essence" in the "midst of present-day cultural decadence" by
promoting every "authentic [arteigene] expression of German cultural
life." It would "enlighten" the German people about the "connections
between race, art, and science." Through lectures and publications, it
would promote the work and thought of "important" Germans who had
been "silenced" by the forces of decay."
Hitler and other Nazi leaders had scathingly denounced cultural "degeneracy" in speeches and writings since the early 1920s. The fact, then,
that the party's systematic effort to instrumentalize cultural anxiety came
only in 1928 requires some explanation. Since its refounding in 1925, the
party's attempt to attract members from all classes of German society
9. See "Dr. Stang spricht," Deutsche Kultur-Wacht 3 (hereafter cited as D K W ) , (1932).
Many of the D K W issues are not dated.
10. The categories used by the Statistisches Reichsamt make it very dificult to reconstruct
unemployment rates for artists. The categories found in the Statistisches JahrGuch's breakdown of the occupational structure of German society do not correspond to those used to
analyze unemployment. This is further complicated by the statistical invisibility nebenberujicher artists who had entirely different official occupations. For the year 1932, the
Reichsamt recorded a quarterly average of 33,118 unemployed in the category "Theater,
Music, and Performance of All Types," representing .6 percent of all unemployed. A
comparison with occupational census figures yields a rough estimate of 33 percent unemployment among artists.
11. "Die Geisteswende,"Mitteilungen des Kampfbundes fur Deutrche Kultur (hereafter cited
as Mitteilungen), January 1929.
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had met with mixed results. Whereas NSDAP recruitment efforts among
the working class had yielded disappointing results, appeals to the middle
and upper-middle classes had been more successful. The party leadership
resolved, therefore, to concentrate its proselytizing on the various layers
of the German bourgeoisie. Germans of the educated and propertied
middle class presented a special recruitment challenge. Although not
numerous in absolute terms, their adherence would lend respectability to
a plebeian movement whose public image derived largely from its lowermiddle-class base and its brown-shirted paramilitary auxiliary. The
plebeian stigma had not necessarily had the effect of keeping elites out of
the party; to the contrary, several categories of German elites had already
demonstrated a higher-than-average proclivity for joining the party.
Nonetheless, party leaders sensed that many members of the educated
and cultural elite continued to shy away from participation in the movement, despite being quietly or potentially sympathetic.12
The founding of the Kampfbundfir deutsche Kultur must therefore be
viewed as part of the same NSDAP organizational reform of 1928-29
that produced new party auxiliaries for university students, teachers,
physicians, and lawyers.13The specific circumstances of the Kampfbund's
birth in 1928, however, remain somewhat obscure due to a paucity of
documents. Bollmus attributes the main initiative to Alfred Rosenberg,
editor of the Volkischer Beobachter, the NSDAP organ, and the party s
unofficial chief spokesman on cultural matters. However, Hans Hinkel,
founder and leader of the Kampfbund's Berlin chapter, claimed in a
postwar statement that Hugo Bruckmann, the Munich right-wing publisher, had been the main force in founding the Kampfbund, and that
Rosenberg had merely commandeered it a short time later.l4 On the
surface, the connection with the party appeared to consist mainly of
overlapping personnel. Among the first set of thirteen directors, Franz
X. Schwarz, the Nazi party treasurer, Franz Ritter von Epp, a retired
general and Nazi Reichstag delegate, and Rosenberg himself were publicly identified with the Nazi movement. The remainder of the board
consisted of prominent non-Nazi members of the German far right
wing, such as publisher Julius F. Lehmann, mathematician Philipp
Lenard, architect Paul Schultze-Naumburg, and Othmar Spann, a lead12. Kater, N a z i Party, 47-48.
13. The question of National Socialist appeals to specific elite groups in German society
has generated a substantial literature. Three notable examples are Geoffrey Giles, Students
and National Socialism in Germany (Princeton, 1985); Michael H. Kater, Doctors under Hitler
(Chapel Hill, 1989); and Konrad H. Jarausch, The U n f e e Profssions: German Lawyers,
Teachers, and Engineers, 1900-1950 (Oxford, 1990).
14. Bollmus, Amt Rosenberg, 30-31; Seventh Army Interrogation Report, SAlC Report
28, "Hans Heinrich Hinkel," 27 May 1945, National Archives, Record Group 238.
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ing exponent of corporatist theory.15 These ambiquities pose the question of whether the Kampfbund was at the very outset conceived as an
NSDAP front organization, or as an autonomous entity embodying an
alliance between National Socialists and other forces of the volkisch
Right. In either case, by mid-1929 National Socialist influence in the
Kampfbund had become preponderant, even though the connection between the two organizations remained informal.
Given the NSDAP's desire to penetrate the German upper bourgeoisie
more effectively, keeping the Kampfbund at arm's length made good
strategic sense. Not only would the Kampfbund avoid the plebeian stigma
of the NSDAP, it would also exploit a widespread antipathy toward
party politics that had infected the German middle and upper-middle
classes.16 Thus, even as it sought to use art and culture to politicize
Germans, the Kampfbund emphasized a pretense to apoliticism. In an
effort to avoid possible party-related problems, its published "Operating
Principles" stressed the non-party character of the organization. The
"fundamental, universal-national" questions to be addressed by the
Kampfbund did not "belong to the competence of political parties."" This
official foreswearing of partisanship was reflected in the Kampfbund's
official newsletter, in which references to the Nazi party and Adolf Hitler
were conspicuously infrequent. The editors treated the NSDAP as a
distinctly separate entity.l8
Accordingly, the Kampfbund's founders foresaw not a centralized
party-style organization, but rather a network of semi-autonomous local
cultural associations, bearing the same label and pursuing similar goals.
They assumed, or hoped, that the nature of social and associational life,
especially in small communities, would enable relatively tiny cadres
of activists to make their mark on political discourse and attitudes.
Coordinated by a central office, and with the newsletter providing an
"intellectual bond,"19 local activists were encouraged to act on their
own initiatives in the planning of public lectures and other functions.
15. "Arbeitsgrundsatze und Gliederung des Kampfbundes fiir Deutsche Kultur," Mitteilungen, January 1929.
16. On apoliticism as a phenomenon of the Weimar right wing see Kurt Sontheimer,
Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik: Diepolitischen ldeen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933 (Munich, 1962), and Armin Mohler, Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932 (Stuttgart, 1950). On grass-roots apoliticism among the
German middle classes see Koshar, Social Life.
17. "Arbeitsgrundskze," as in note 15.
18. In the spring of 1930, when Diemer Willroda, the leader of the NSDAP's "Group
Visual Artists" in Dresden, published a piece on "Art, Culture, and Nation" in the
newsletter, the author was clearly identified as a guest contributor. "Kunst, Kultur und
Nation," Mitteilungen, April-June, 1930.
19. "Arbeitsgrundsatze," as in note 15.
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Members were also especially encouraged to use word-of-mouth to
"personally inform all acquaintances about the idea of the Kampfbund."
Envisaging a kind of Nazi salon culture, the Kampfbund leadership hoped
that "small groups of adherents" would gather for "monthly conversation evenings" to discuss relevant issues and to "deepen personal
familiarity. "*O
Although the Kampjbund had announced its existence to the world in
May 1928, its real work first began in early 1929. Operating out of a
small office in Munich, the organization initiated publication of a newsletter, the Mitteilungen, in January 1929. The anonymous editors implored adherents to purchase "as many copies as possible" at ten Pfennige
each, and to distribute them to "ideological comrades" (Cesinnungsgenossen) and to "honest persons who still stand o ~ t s i d e . " ~Each
'
issue contained one or two feature articles dealing in some depth with issues of
culture and ideology. Several shorter pieces documented artistic and
cultural developments around Germany from the Kampfbund's ideological perspective, often focusing on prominent exponents of modernism
and socially critical art, such as Max Reinhardt. These articles were
supplemented by previews or summaries of Kampjund-sponsored functions, and status reports on the growth and activities of various chapters
around Germany.
In February 1929 the Kampfbund initiated its series of public lectures.
These functions, which were relatively inexpensive and easy to organize,
became the most common form of Kampfbund-sponsored activity.
Othmar Spann, a member of the Kampfbund Board of Directors, presented the inaugural lecture. An economist best known for his espousal
of the organic, corporatist state, Spann had already won substantial
popularity among Weimar conservatives. His lecture, entitled "The
Cultural Crisis of the Present," called for the elimination of liberalism
and democracy, and their replacement by a system of authoritarian
leadership supported by popular will. The lecture was a success inasmuch as it attracted a large audience to the main auditorium at the
University of Munich and stimulated attention in the press." A short
time later, musicologist Alfred Heuss lectured at the university in
Munich under Kampfbund auspices. Highly regarded for his research on
Handel and Bach, Heuss was the editor of the prestigious Zeitschrij fur
Musik. Heuss's Kampfbund lecture dealt with "The Crisis of German
Music," bemoaning the "formal materialism" that had come to domi20. "An die Arbeit," Mitteilungen, May 1929.
21. "Aufforderung," Mifteilungen, January 1929.
22. "Die Kulturkrise der Gegenwart," Mitteilungen, March 1939.,In the speech, Spann
also made a point of praising the KampJbund's "non-partisanship" (Uberparteilichkeit).
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nate German music at the expense of "metaphysical deepening."23
After these appearances, neither Spann nor Heuss figured prominently
in Kampfbund programming. The spotlight shifted in large part to Rosenberg himself, signaling a shift toward a more pronounced National
Socialist dominance of the organization. In April 1929, Rosenberg placed
himself on the program for the first time. His lecture was an attack on the
trend toward greater sensuality in art, which he saw as one arm in a
pincers movement closing in on German culture. Rosenberg ominously
described how African primitivism crept into central Europe from the
south, promoted by "niggerized Americanism" and French "power
politics." Meanwhile, the second pincer, formed by "Mongolian waves
of bolshevism," besieged Germany from the east, threatening the "extermination of all German cultural values." Unless stopped, these forces
would transform Germany into a formless "swamp culture" (Sumpfkultur).'"hese
dire portents reflected the volkisch right wing's preoccupation with the impulsiveness and sensuality of trends like jazz, and
with the role played by Germany's internal and external enemies in the
popularization of such movements. Kampfbund propaganda would seize
on this theme repeatedly. A golden opportunity to emphasize the conspiratorial nature of the threat presented itself in the spring of 1930, when
Paul Robeson (a black) was scheduled to perform in Berlin under the
auspices of Max Reinhardt (a Jew).25
If Kampfbund adherents could take solace from the the scarcity of
blacks in German society, elemental fears of emancipated women could
not be so easily repressed. In the autumn of 1929, the Kampfbund
launched its first of many attacks on female emancipation. It took the
form of a newsletter article titled "Dollarism and Feminism," by one
E. Klein-Wintermann of Leipzig. The article combined its indictment of
emancipation with an attack on another favorite target, the mammonist
culture of modern capitalism. The growing materialism and lasciviousness of contemporary society, the author reasoned, stemmed from the
unleashing of feminine instincts hitherto kept under control by civilized
people. These included a lust for pleasure, the "gratification of all
23. Donald W. Ellis, "Music in the Third Reich: National Socialist Aesthetic Theory as
Governmental Policy" (Ph.D. diss., University o f Kansas, 1970). 33-35.
24. "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen, May 1929.
25. "Wider die Negerkultur-fir deutsches Volkstum," Mitteilungen, April-June 1930.
On an earlier Kampfbund attack on Reinhardt see "Der Fall Reinhardt," Mitteilungen, April
1929. On German prejudices toward blacks and "coloreds" during the Weimar era see
Reiner Pommerin, "Sterilisierung der Rheinlandbastarde": Das Schicksal einer farbigen deutschen
Minderheit 1918-1937 (Diisseldorf, 1979); Gisela Lebzelter, "Die 'Schwarze Schrnach':
V~rurteildropa~anda-Mythos," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 11 (1985): 37-58; and Sally
Marks, "Black Watch on the Rhine: A Study in Propaganda, Prejudice, and Prurience,"
European Studies Review 13 (1983): 297-334.
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imaginable vanities," and "indulgence of every possible sensual and
sensory titillation up to the most refined sadism." Klein-Wintermann
saw the descent into an "animalistic life of instinct" as "the quintessence
of a specifically feminine-determined civilization process." As the article's title suggested, this particular form of degeneration was especially
acute in the United States. Echoing a widely accepted stereotype of
A m e r i ~ aKlein-Wintermann
,~~
depicted an uncultured society, a "dollar
paradise" obsessed with technology (e.g. "senseless automobile driving") and an unbridled materialism. At the heart of this allegedly degenerate system stood "the American female," whose licentiousness and
"unparalleled extravagance" had reduced her male companion (the
"Yankee") to a "work and love slave," a "trained poodle," an "industriously rotating dollar generator," whose main purpose in life had
become the satiation of his mate's acquisitiveness and lust for physical
pleasure. To Klein-Wintermann, therefore, America presented a worstcase scenario for unrestrained capitalism's ability to debase the soul, and
to emasculate the male. "Americanization" would inevitably produce the
same result in Germany.27
While lectures, literary readings, and music recitals accounted for the
majority of Kampfbund programs between 1929 and 1931, some local
chapters seized the initiative to undertake more ambitious projects. The
Bonn chapter organized an "Exhibition of the Good German Book," in
December 1929. The Bonn Kampfbund arranged for special displays of
nationalistic books to be set up in local bookstores, which could in turn
integrate the displays into pre-Christmas pr~motions.~'
In early 1930,
the Diisseldorf chapter attempted to persuade the city monuments commission to erect a memorial to Albert Leo Schlageter, the German
nationalist martyr who, in 1923, had been executed by French occupation authorities in the Rhineland.29 At the same time, the Kampfbund
activists lobbied against the erection of a monument to Diisseldorfs
most controversial son, the poet Heinrich Heine, a baptized Jew and
political di~sident.~'In April 1930, the same Diisseldorf chapter sponsored an elaborate Bismarck festival in the city's concert hall, with the
music provided by the local Association of Retired Military musician^.^'
26. In his anti-Americanism, Klein-Wintermann was picking up on a theme developed
more fully in A. Halfeld's book America and Americanism Uena, 1927). Stark, Entrepreneurs of
Ideology, 177.
27. "Dollarismus und Feminismus," Mitteilungen, September-October 1929.
28. "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen, November-December, 1929.
29. On the creation and exploitation of the Schlageter myth, see Jay Baird, T o Die for
Germany: Heroes in the N a z i Pantheon (Bloomington, 1990), chapter 2.
30. "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen, January-March, 1930.
31. "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen, June-August, 1930.
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Conceived essentially on the model of the Bildungsburgertum, the
Kampfbund did not attract members in numbers comparable to those of
mass organizations or political parties. From April 1929 to January 1932,
membership climbed from 300 to around 2,100.32During this period the
Mitteilungen published the names and, in most cases, occupations of 527
new members (i.e., about 25 percent of all members) who had agreed
publicly to acknowledge their connection with the Kampfbund. The
Appendix presents a sociographic analysis of this data, from which several
significantpatterns emerge. The Kampfbund, not surprisingly, overwhelmingly attracted elite segments of the German bourgeoisie. The university
milieu produced 17.1 percent of the sample, with professors forming the
largest single subgroup, representing 12.5 percent of the entire sample.
Academic professionals from fields such as the law, medicine, and education constituted an additional 19 percent of the sample. Artists and
intellectuals, including writers, editors, performing artists, visual artists,
and architects, made up 15.1 percent of the member sample. Entrepreneurs, including several publishers and manufacturers, together with
high-level business managers, such as syndics and executive directors
(Gescha$s&hrer), combined to form 5.9 percent of the sample. A bit
higher, at 6.1 percent, was the representation of middle and high-level
civil servants. Nobility with ranks higher than von and socialites represented 4.2 percent of the sample, and other elites (parsons, officials of
social-cultural associations) represented 4.5 percent of the sample. Taken
together, all of these socially elite groups, which accounted for less than 3
percent of the total German adult p ~ p u l a t i o nconstituted
,~~
71.9 percent
of the Kampfbund sample.
Beyond the Besitz und Bildungsburgertum, the sample reflects the Kampfbund's particular attraction for members of the nobility. O f the sample's
twenty-two noblemen and noblewomen with titles above the rank of
von, nineteen listed no further o c ~ u p a t i o n Among
.~~
them were three
princes (including Wolrad and Friedrich Christian of SchaumburgLippe), one princess, and one archprincess. By late 1929, the Kampfbund
could also count among its adherents Walter von Bogen u. Schostedt, the
executive director of the German Society of Nobility (Deutsche Adelsgenossenschaft).
Among lower-middle-class members of the sample, merchants
(KaufIeute) and small businessmen were the most prominent, constituting 8.2 percent of the total sample. Low-level white-collar employees
formed 5.7 percent of the sample, and low-level civil servants an
32. Bollmus, Amt Rosenberg, 29.
33. Kater, Nazi Party, 241.
34. An additional twenty-one held the title of von.
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additional 1.5 percent. Only two of the listed members, a machine
builder and a railroad assistant, could be classified as skilled manual
workers. Taken together, these petit-bourgeois groups (adding in
widows and pensioners) composed only 18.6 percent of the Kampfbund
sample. By comparison, these social categories formed the collective
backbone of the NSDAP, accounting for well over 50 percent of all
card-carrying party members.
Women constituted 15.7 percent of the Kampfbund sample, suggesting
a level of female representation in the Kampfbund roughly double that
encountered in the NSDAP, which discouraged female m e m b e r ~ h i pIt. ~ ~
was, perhaps, precisely the pronounced antifeminism noted earlier that
attracted tradition-minded women to the Kampfbund. For thirty-one of
the eighty-three women in the sample, no occupation was listed, indicating a strong probability that many fulfilled traditional gender roles as
wives and mothers. The sample includes four noblewomen and three
socialites. Several women in the sample were listed as representatives of
conservative and traditional organizations such as the Richard Wagner
Association of German Women (Richard-Wagner- Verband deutscher
Frauen), the League of German Girl Scouts (Bund deutscher Pfadjnderinnen), and the Association for German Women's Culture (Verband fur
Deutsche Frauenkultur). In addition to five women who listed themselves
as "widows," there were many who identified themselves as spouses
(e.g., Geh. Ratsgattin). Although these characteristics of the female membership further underscore the Kampfbund's traditionalist attraction, one
should not overlook the presence of significant numbers of females in the
professional, artistic, and intellectual subgroups.36 Moreover, several
women performed important functions for the organization. Winifried
Wagner and Eva Chamberlain gave the Kampfbund their blessing, and
allowed their names to be associated with it publicly. Elsa Bruckmann,
wife of the conservative publisher Hugo Bruckmann, was a member of
the first Board of Directors. Other women were engaged as performers
at Kampfbund-sponsored events, particularly in Munich. In November
1929, Countess Edlth Salburg read from her writings about "old Austrian reminiscences" at a "social evening" held at the Munich Men's
Club. The next month, Irma Strunz-Bargehr, a retired Berlin actress,
read excerpts from Holderlin, Goethe, and Schiller at the Munich Festsaal. In February 1930, singer Emmy Kriiger of Bayreuth performed
35. Kater, Nazi Party, 254.
36. For lucid discussions of the phenomenon of right-wing women in the Weimar
Republic see Jill Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women (London, 1981), chapter 1;
Ute Frevert, Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation,
trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans (New York, 1989). chapter 15; and Renate Bridenthal et al.,
When Biology Became Destiny: Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany (New York, 1984).
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ballads during an evening of "rich artistic enjoyment." In May 1930,
Juga Krannhals-Russel, wife of Paul Krannhals, a leading theorist of the
authoritarian "organic state," read from her poems.37
Aside from considerations of class and gender, the Kampfbund lists also
reflect the geographical distribution of members before 1932, suggesting
a pattern of highly localized organizational success. As with most grassroots organizations, much depended on the ability and determination of
activists on the scene. Of the sample's 527 names, sixty-seven listed
Munich as the city of residence. The other larger chapters were Dresden,
with forty-six names in the sample; BonntBad Godesberg, with fortyfour; Dusseldorf, with thirty-two, and Berlin, with thirty. Heidelberg,
like Bonn an old university town, was home to twenty-eight of those
appearing on the lists, while Jena, site of another university, had thirteen
names in the sample. On the other hand, only a single member was listed
for Tubingen, the site of a venerable university, while none were listed
for the university towns of Marburg and Gottingen. In Bavaria, outside
of the cultural center of Munich, the Kampfbund established a significant
presence only in Nuremberg (including Erlangen), home to nine members on the lists, and, oddly, the small city of Nordlingen, whose six
acknowledged Kampfbund members included the mayor. This pattern of
isolated successes held true for northern Germany as well. For example
the lists showed no members in Bremen, and only four each in Hanover
and Hamburg. Yet the obscure community of Quakenbruck placed four
residents on the membership lists, while the nearby cities of Oldenburg
and Osnabruck had only one acknowledged member between them.
The lists reveal still another important dimension to the Kampfbund's
growth between 1928 and 1931. One finds numerous examples of groupjoining by persons drawn from common social or occupational environments. In early 1930, seven Heidelberg university students joined at
around the same time, as did two teachers from Weissenfels. In the
spring of 1930, four merchants joined in Dusseldorf, as did two widows
in Karlsruhe, two junior lawyers (Referendare)in Oppeln, and two retired
civil servants in Pocking (near Munich). These patterns suggest that
word-of-mouth and small-scale, informal organizing among personal
acquaintances did assist in the Kampfbund's growth, much as the founders
had intended.38 At the end of 1929, the Board of Directors expressed
satisfaction that Kampfbund members had hosted numerous "functions in
37. Information from the sections "An unsere Mitglieder und Freunde," Mitteilungen,
November-December 1929-June-August 1930.
38. This conclusion supports the findings of Koshar, Social Life, on the social roots of
National Socialism in Marburg. There is no record of pre-1933 Kampfbund activity in that
university town.
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intimate circles" to supplement the more visible public programs.39
O n only one occasion prior to 1933 did the Kampfbund enjoy an
opportunity to exercise direct political power. When National Socialist
Wilhelm Frick became Minister of the Interior and Culture in a rightwing coalition in Thuringia between January 1930 and April 1931, he
appointed Hans Severus Ziegler, leader of the Thuringian Kampfbund, to
the post of "Culture, Art, and Theater Specialist." Ziegler used his
position to coordinate a purge of modern art from museums and public
buildings under his jurisdiction. Noting the need to protect "moral
forces" against "alien racial influences" and the "glorification of Negroism," Frick proclaimed restrictions on performances of "jazz band and
percussion music, Negro dances, [and] Negro songs." The Kampfbund
newsletter, while carefully avoiding mention of Frick's connection with
the NSDAP, warmly praised the measures in Thuringia, noting that "for
the first time since 1918, something official is being undertaken against
racial and spiritual decomposition. '''O
Frick and Ziegler also brought in Paul Schultze-Naumburg to head the
State Academy of Art in Weimar. An original member of the Kampfbund's Board of Directors, Schultze-Naumburg had gradually emerged
as the Kampfbund's leading public spokesman after Rosenberg. SchultzeNaumburg is known primarily for his notorious book Kunst und Rasse
(Art and Race), published in 1928, in which he argued that the images
depicted in abstract or expressionist painting were accurate manifestations of the artists' own state of racial decay. The patent absurdity of this
theory should not be permitted to obscure the fact that SchultzeNaumburg had once been counted among Germany's most respected
architect^.^' As a proponent of a kind of progressive historicism in the
latter years of the German Empire and the early years of the Weimar
Republic, Schultze-Naumburg had sought to synthesize the geometric
simplicity of the emerging modern style with essential characteristics of
traditional German home design. But the audacity and quick pace of
architectural experimentation in the 1920s transformed SchultzeNaumburg into one of the leading critics of modern a r ~ h i t e c t u r e A
.~~
figure of Schultze-Naumburg's stature undoubtedly helped pave the
Kampfbund's way to legitimacy in many circles.
With Kampfbund activists at least temporarily inhabiting positions of
39. "Das erste Jahr," Mitteilungen, November-December 1929.
40. "Wider die Negerkultur," Mitteilungen, as in note 25.
41. For example, Berthold Hinz, Art in the Third Reich (New York, 1979), 25, describes
Schultze-Naumburg as "one of the leading cultural ideologists of National Socialism," but
makes no mention of his earlier progressive tendencies.
42. Lane, Architecture, 156-60.
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power in Thuringia, the organization chose Weimar, the province's
capital, as the site for a threeday youth festival in June 1930. Conspicuous on the list of the twenty-eight participating youth organizations
were the National Socialist Student League (NS-Studentenbund), the Hitler Youth, and several other groups connected to the Nazi party. Other
participants included the Wandervogel, the League of German Girl Scouts,
and the National Association of German Ofticers (Nationalverband deutscher Ofiziere). Determined to "combat all manifestations destructive to
race and nation," the assembled youth marched through the streets,
participated in "strenuous" sporting events, and heard numerous
nationalistic speeches.43
If the events in Thuringia had contributed to the merging of the
Kampfbund's public identity with that of the NSDAP, developments in
the Kampfbund's Berlin chapter erased all remaining distinctions. Hans
Hinkel, a professional Nazi activist and propagandist from the earliest
days of the movement, founded the Berlin chapter in 1930. In 1932,
Hinkel, known for his impetuousness and ambition, struck a deal with
Joseph Goebbels, the Gauleiter of Berlin, according to which the Kampfbund would serve as the party's "major bearer of the struggle for German culture" in Berlin. Goebbels ordered all NSDAP members in his
Gau who were artists and "culture creators" to join the K a m ~ f b u n dIt. ~ ~
was, however, still possible to be a Kampfbund member without joining
the party; the Kampfbund thus retained its function as a back door into the
Nazi movement for reluctant Germans. As an NSDAP document from
September 1932 explained, the Kampfbund "struggles for the promotion
of German culture as defined by Adolf Hitler, however it does not
restrict its work to members of the Nazi party." The Kampfbund could
therefore "appeal to persons active in German cultural life who decline a
formal connection with the party." The Kampfbund would "agitate and
assemble" culturally active Germans, drawing them into a circle that
would, ideally, "prepare them for entry into the Nazi party," or, at least,
into an "atmosphere" imbued with the "principles of the National
Socialist movement. "45
In 1932 the Berlin Kampfbund also intensified its propaganda and
programs aimed specifically at professional artists, seeking to transform
the chapter into a shadow professional association (Berufsverband) modelled on other NSDAP professional a u x i l i a r i e ~In
. ~the
~ politically rarified
43. "Weimar," Mitteilungen, JuneAugust 1930.
44. "NSDAP Wr Deutsche Kultur," DKW 3 (1932).
45. "Abmachungen zwischen der Abtl. Volksbildung und dem Kampfbund fir deutsche
Kultur," 24 September 1932, Berlin Document Center (hereafter cited as BDC), Research
Files, Binder 211.
46. "Tatigkeit des KfDK--Gruppe Berlin," DKW 3 (1932).
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cultural environment of Berlin, many artists responded. The Berlin
musician Giinther Thiele described how the Kampfbund had assisted in his
conversion to National Socialism:
Before I entered the party, I joined my National Socialist professional
group of the Kampfbund fur deutsche Kultur. My registration was on
1 October 1932, under number 4624 (Group Music). In the many
weekly meetings I heard discussions of the goals of the Bund. Even
when the audience contained only thirty to forty listeners . . . the
speakers implanted in me the idea of the Bund and the struggle against
Jewish art and against many Jewish artists. I then committed myself
against everything J e w i ~ h . ~ '
In addition to raising the Kampfbund's profile to artists such as Thiele,
Hinkel's maneuvers in Berlin had several further important consequences. They made Hinkel a prominent party figure on the Berlin
cultural scene, positioning him strategically for powerful appointments
after the seizure of power; they gave Gauleiter Goebbels a major voice in
the affairs of an organization that was nominally under the leadership of
his competitor Alfred Rosenberg; they transferred the center of Karnpfbund activity from Munich to Berlin; and they significantly increased the
size of the Kampfbund's membership. During 1932, total Kampfbund
membership for the entire Reich rose from 2,100 to around 6,000.48
Although a good portion of this increase must be attributed to the overall
growth of the Nazi movement's popularity, one must surmise that the
Hinkel-Goebbels arrangement in Berlin played a major role as well.
Under Hinkel's leadership, the Berlin chapter attracted the participation of several prestigious figures from the local cultural scene. In the
field of music, among the most active was Professor Doctor h.c. Gustav
Havemann. A violinist, Havemann had become concertmaster of the
Lubeck orchestra in 1901 at the age of 19. At age 27 he took over the
concertmaster's seat in Hamburg, and at age 33, in 1915, he moved on to
the same position at the State Opera in Dresden, one of Germany's finest
and most prestigious cultural institutions. In 1920, Havemann was
appointed Professor of Violin at the Academy of Music in Berlin, arguably the pinnacle of music pedagogy. Like Schultze-Naumburg, Havemann had come of age in an earlier era, and had experienced the shock of
the new with the coming of the Republic. Precisely when he turned to
the Kampfbund is not known. By the end of 1932 he had joined the
directorate of the Music Section of the Kampfbund, had become director
47. Statement by Thiele, 30 April 1936, BDC, Reichskulturkammer collection, file of
Giinther Thiele.
48. Bollmus, Amt Rosenberg, 29.
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of the newly founded Kampfbund symphony orchestra in Berlin, and had
contributed anti-Semitic articles to Kampfbund publications.49 Other
prominent musical figures active for the Kampfbund were Clemens
Krauss, musical director at the Berlin City Opera, who led the opera
section of the Kampfbund's Berlin chapter; Professor Max Trapp, a teacher of
composition at the Berlin Academy of Music and member of the Prussian Academy of Arts, who served as coordinator for serious music in the
Kampfbund's Berlin chapter; and Prof. Dr. h.c. Paul Graener, who served
as the Berlin chapter's expert for music education. A member of the
Prussian Academy of Arts, Graener had been a conductor at the Royal
Academy of Music in London as early as 1896, had directed the Mozarteum in Salzburg from 1910 to 1914, and had directed the prestigious
Stern Conservatory in Berlin since 1930.'O
In 1932, the Berlin chapter initiated publication of the Deutsche KulturW~cht.~'
This illustrated journal, edited by Hinkel, featured articles on
diverse aspects of high and popular culture. The very first issue boasted
on page one of the Kampfbund-Berlin's commitment to the cause of "our
Fuhrer" Adolf Hitler, and to its intimate association with the NSDAP.52
The second issue to appear in 1932 contained a declaration of support for
Adolf Hitler signed by fifty-four university instructors, forty-five of
whom possessed the title of professor.53 Many of the signatories were
scholars in the fields of ethnography, cultural history, art, music, and
literature: Ludwig Muhlhausen of Hamburg was an expert on Celtic
philology; Anton Jirku of Breslau specialized in the history of the Jews of
antiquity; Eugen Fehrle of Heidelberg was an authority on German
folklore and festivals; Karl Endemann of Heidelberg had published
authoritative works on the Sotho languages of southern Africa; Karl
Bornhausen of Breslau had authored a study of Pascal's ethics; Ewald
Banse of Braunschweig was a prolific scholar of the culture and geography of Asia Minor and North Africa; and Karl Matthaei of Tiibingen
specialized in the history and performance of organ music.54
49. For example, "Was ich vom Kampfbund fir deutsche Kultur fur die Musik
erwarte," D K W , special issue (1932). For biographical background seeJoseph Wulf, Musik
im Dritten Reich: Eine Dokumentation (Gutersloh, 1963; Frankfurt, 1983). 20.
50. For biographical data see Wulf, Musik, 15 (Graener), 204 (Trapp), and Boguslaw
Drewniak, Das Theater im NS-Staat: Szenarium deutscher Zeitgeschichte (Dusseldorf, 1983),
399 (Krauss). For their offices in the Kampfbund, see D K W 3 (1932): 18-19.
51. The Kampfbund Reich leadership had been planning to issue its own publication, but
decided not to after the Gruppe Berlin seized the initiative to publish its own journal. "Die
'Kultur-Wachtl-Reichsorgan des KtDK," D K W 3 (1932).
52. "Wir gehen in Front," D K W 1 (1932).
53. "Deutsche Hochschullehrer bekennen sich fur den Fuhrer der nationalsozialistischen
Bewegung," D K W 2 (1932).
54. Biographical data in Kurschners Deutscher Gelehrten-Kalender (Berlin, 1928129). Muhl-

4 18

WEIMAR CULTURE AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM

Kampfbund propaganda, as transmitted through the Kultur- Wacht,
points up two important characteristics of the cultural agenda of the
National Socialist movement on the eve of its seizure of power, both of
which are important for understanding the evolution of state cultural
policy after 1933. First, the selection of articles represented a mix of
crude racial theory with more mainstream, conservative perspectives on
culture. Racist treatises, exposOs on Jewish-Marxist influence in the arts,
and demands for the elimination of foreigners from German cultural life
appeared side by side with feature articles on figures such as Schiller.
This hybrid of tradition and radicalism would remain a hallmark of Nazi
cultural policy.
A second area of emphasis in the Kultur- Wacht addressed the supposed
ravages of capitalism on the material welfare of German artists. The
problem in the arts was simply not one of so-called degeneracy, but also
one of misdirected financing, poor central planning, and disparities between supply and demand for the services of artists. The magazine
provided a forum for ideas about how such problems could be addressed
through fundamental economic and structural reform of the arts. For
example, many articles sketched out ideas for rationalization of the
German theater economy, emphasizing the theme of deliberalization,
which usually entailed a combination of professionalization measures,
work-creation programs, and audience mass-subscription arrangem e n t ~ In
. ~the
~ field of music, the Kampfbund called for greater official
regulation of the progressive "mechanization" of music through radio,
film, and records, and for replacing the existing fractious, increasingly
impotent labor unions and professional associations with a corporatist
"unified representation of the music estate" that would look out for
musicians' economic interests and social concerns more effe~tively.~~
In addition to initiating publication of the Kultur- Wacht, the Kampfbund
expanded its lecture programming significantly in 1932. A high percentage of the public lectures sponsored by the Kampfbund featured bona fide
academics speaking on seemingly apolitical topics, such as "Goethe and
hausen's edited edition of Die Vier Zweige des Mabinogi (Pedeir ceinc y Mabinogi), originally
published in 1925, has been recently republished (Tiibingen, 1988). Other notable publications by these scholars are as follows: Anton Jirku, Juden Agyptens in ptolemaischer und
romisher Zeit (Vienna, 1924);Eugen Fehrle, Deutsche Feste und Volksbrauche (Leipzig, 1927);
Karl Endemann, ed., Wiirterbuch der Sotho-Sprache (Hamburg, 1911); Karl Bornhausen, Die
Ethik Pascals (Giessen, 1907); Ewald Banse, Die Turkei: Eine Modeme Geographie (Braunschweig, 1919); Karl Matthaei, Ausgewahlte Orgelwerke, 5 vols. (Kassel, 1928-36).
+ Alan E. Steinweis, "The Economic, Social, and Professional Dimensions of Nazi
Cultural Policv: The Case of the Reich Theater Chamber," German Studies Review 13
(October 1990j: 441-59.
56. "Allgemeine Richtlinien des 'Kampfbundes fir deutsche Kultur," im Hinblick auf
seine musikalischen Aufgaben," D K W 2 (1932).

Nature, " and "Heroism and Human Greatness. "57 German Bestelmeyer,
the President of the Academy of Visual Arts in Munich, and also a
professor of architecture at the prestigious Technical University in the
Bavarian capital,58delivered an address on "Objectivity in Old and New
Architecture. " Other Kampfbund-sponsored lectures tended to emphasize
themes closer to the core of Nazi ideology. Paul Schultze-Naumburg
continued to be a popular attraction.
Aside from overt propaganda, the Kampfbund sponsored musical and
theatrical performances with increasing frequency in 1932. Kampfbund
concerts emphasized the music of great German composers, such as
Handel, Bach, and Mozart, and also provided exposure to the works of
contemporary composers, exponents of traditionalism such as Paul
Graener, Max Trapp, and Hans Bullerian, whose compositions had
supposedly been suppressed by the dominant Jewish cabal to bolshevize
culture. In the realm of theater, 1932 saw the Kampfbund initiate a theater
subscription plan in Munich. The plan was designed to enable the Kampfbund to sponsor its own productions, which would play before full
houses of subscribers who had purchased tickets at substantial discounts.
This was not an original plan; the efficacy ofthe subscription arrangement had already been demonstrated by the Volksbuhne and similar theater
organizations of the Weimar era.59 The Kamp3und's mediocre productions of obscure pieces, however, were poorly attended, lost a good deal
of money, and were halted after only a few months. Yet the failed
experiment did not undermine the National Socialists' faith in the feasibility and political utility of a mass theater subscription scheme, which
the Kraft durch Freude organization implemented with immense success
during the Nazi regime.60
When the Nazi party came to power in 1933, it appeared that the
Kampfbund might acquire a dominant role in German cultural life. Nazi
officials appointed Kampfbund activists to pivotal positions in cultural
administrations at the state and Reich levels. The leader of the Berlin
chapter, the Nazi "Old Fighter" Hans Hinkel, was appointed by Hermann Goring to head the,Prussian Theater Commission, which, in the
spring of 1933, supervised the mass dismissals of ideologically unacceptable theater personnel in Germany's largest state.61 Kampfbund activists
57. D K W 4 (1932): 13-14.
58. Biographical data in Kurschners Deutscher Celehrten-Kalender (Berlin, 1928129).
59. For an explanation see Guttsman, Workers' Culture, 208.
60. On the success of KdF entertainment programs see Otto Marrenbach, ed., Fundamente des Sieges: Die Cesamtarbeit der Deutschen Arbeitsfront von 1933 bis 1940 (Berlin,
1940). 334-35.
61. Comitt des DBtgations Juives, Das Schwarzbuch: Tatsachen und Dokumente. Die Lage
derluden in Deutschland 1933 (Paris, 1934). 423.
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were instrumental in the political "coordination" of professional associations and labor unions in the cultural sector; Gustav Havemann, for
example, seized control of Germany's largest musicians' union, the German Musician's Association (Deutscher Musiker V e r b ~ n d )Throughout
.~~
Germany, artists rushed to join the Kampfbund. Between January and
October, membership rose from 6,000 to 38,000.63Most of the new
members joined for opportunistic reasons, figuring that membership
would increase job security or improve future prospects, although quite
a few probably felt genuinely grateful for the opportunity to join a
movement with which they had quietly sympathized in the past.
The rapid growth of the Kampfbund in 1933, both in size and in
influence, proved deceptive. The Kampfbund had served as a useful tool
during the rise to power and the phase of political "coordination." By
the beginning of 1934, however, the new Reich Ministry of Propaganda,
together with the ministry-supervised Reich Chamber of Culture (Reichskulturkammer), both under the leadership of Joseph Goebbels, had outmaneuvered Rosenberg in the quest to institutionalize Nazi control of the
arts. As the compulsory professional organization for culture, the Chamber of Culture embodied many of the very corporatist reform concepts
that the Kampfbund had advocated. Ironically, compulsory membership
for artists in the Chamber of Culture undermined the Kampfbund's base
of support. Artists no longer perceived an urgent need to join the
Kampfbund, as they had during the confused months of 1933. The decline
of the Kampfbund also resulted from Hitler's lack of faith in Rosenberg's
capacity to administer a large organization, as well as the Fuhrer's confidence in the ability of Goebbels to reconcile the German culture establishment to Nazi rule. The Kampfbund suffered a severe diminution in
influence and status, and from 1934 on, under a new name, the National
Socialist Culture Community (NationalsozialistischeKulturgemeinde) exercised only minor influence in German cultural affairs. Removed from the
center of power, Rosenberg's new organization quickly emerged as a
hard-line critic of Goebbels's Chamber of Culture, accusing him of
coddling modernists and of moving too slowly on the purge of Jews
from German artistic life.64
Despite its rapid decline, the Kampfbund had left an important legacy.
It had helped set much of the cultural agenda for the Third Reich,
aggressively promoting corporatism, anti-Semitism, and a hybrid of
62. Documents in BDC, Reichskulturkammer collection, file of Gustav Havemann, and
Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Reichskulturkammer-Zentrale (R561), file 66.
63. Bollmus, Amt Rosenberg, 29.
64. See Volker Dahm, "Die Reichskulturkammer als Instrument kulturpolitischer
Steuerung und sozialer Reglementierung," Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 34 (January
1986): 53-84.
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artistic conservatism and "Blood and Soil" radicalism. It had also served
as a training ground for many activists who, after 1933, migrated to key
positions in the Propaganda Ministry or in the Chamber of Culture. In
1940, Hans Hinkel, who had come to occupy several influential positions
in the Propaganda Ministry and the Chamber of Culture, recalled that
many "old activists" from the Kampfbund were "still around in this
sector. "65 In addition to Hinkel, notable Kampfbund veterans wielding
power in the Chamber of Culture included the writer Hanns Johst, who
served as President of the Reich Literature Chamber from 1935 to 1945,
Otto Laubinger, who led the Reich Theater Chamber from 1933 until his
death in 1935, and Heinz Ihlert, who ran the day-to-day operation of the
Reich Music Chamber in his capacity as Executive Director.
How significant a role had the Kampfbund played in helping the Nazi
movement to power? Until 1932, antirepublican Germans energized by
artistic and cultural antimodernism saw the Kampfbund as a means for
engaging in the struggle against "decay" while avoiding the descent into
party politics. lnitially reluctant to sign on with the Nazis, respectable
citizens, some of them prominent, lent their names (if not their active
participation) to the Kampfbund. In doing so, they avoided direct identification with the Hitler party for a time, but nevertheless conferred
respectability on an artistic and cultural worldview consistent with that
of the NSDAP. When the Kampfbund began openly and explicitly to
boast of its support for Hitler in 1932, it had already secured its image as
a reputable organization with numerous socially and artistically prominent members.
Between 1929 and Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship on
30 January 1933, elite support for the Nazi movement grew in almost
every measurable respect, be it in terms of party membership, electoral
support, or affiliation with professional front organization^.^^ Several
factors converged to produce this shift in favor of National Socialism:
intensifying fears of communism, frustration with the messy politics of
the Weimar "system," and perceived economic self-interest. The case of
the Kampfbund suggests that the National Socialist movement's skill at
exploiting the widespread cultural anxiety of the Weimar era was a
further significant factor in the formation of the Nazi upper-middle-class
constituency.
65. Hinkel to Johst, 20 February 1940, BDC, Reichskulturkammer collection, file of
Hans Friedrich Blunck.
66. Childers, Nazi Voter, 243; Kater, Nazi Party, 62; Falter, Hitlers Wiihler, 277-85;
Giles, Students, 62-100; Jarausch, Unfree Professions, 92-107; Miihlberger, Hitler's Followers,
206. Also see the essays in two excellent anthologies: Thomas Childers, ed., The Formation
ofthe Nazi Constituency 1919-1933 (London, 1986); and Peter D . Stachura, ed., The N a z i
Machtergreifung (London 1983).
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APPENDIX

Occupation/Social Background of Self-Acknowledged
Kampfound Joiners, 1928-193 1

University milieu
Professors
Instructors
Students

Entrepreneurs & upper management
High and middle civil servants

Professionals
Medicine
Law
Education
Engineers
Other

Artists-intellectuals
Writers, editors, journalists
Artists
Architects

Nobility (above von)
Socialites

Other
Parsons
Oficials of social-cultural
associations
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Lower-middle class
L o w civil servants
White-collar employees
Merchants/small business
Skilled workers/crajismen
Widows G pensioners

N o occupation/social position
listed

Source: Lists of new members published in the Mitteilungen des Kampfbundes fur Deutsche
Kultur, January 1929-JulylDecember 1931.
Note: The Mitteilungen listed new individual members who agreed to have their names
published. Since the estimated total membership of the Kampfbund was 2,100 as ofJanuary
1932, the published names represent about 25 percent of the total membership.
Explanation and examples of categories: Professors: holders of the title Professor, Instructors: holders of the title Privatdozent; Students: those identified explicitly as Student or
degree candidate, e.g., stud. theol.; High and Middle Civil Servants: mainly those holding
the title Rat, Geheimrat, Regienrngsrat; Low Civil Servants: e.g., Regienrngsbaumeister,
Polizeiwachtmeister, Entrepreneurs: Fabrikant, Fabrikbesitzer, Verleger, etc.; Upper Management: e.g., Syndikus, Geschiifisfuhrer, Verwaltungsdirektor, Postinspektor; White-Collar
Employees: e.g., Angestellter, Sekretar, Prokurist, Assistent, Buchhalter, MerchantsISmall
Business: e.g., Kaufmann, Landwirt, Buchhandler, Skilled Workers and Craftsmen: one
Maschinenbauer and one Eisenbahnassistent; Medicine: Arzt, Zahnarzt; Law: Rechtsanwalt,
Referendar, Education: Lehrer, Studienrat; Engineers: Dipl. Ingenieur, Chemiker, Other professionals: Apotheker, Wissenschajiler, Archivar, Artists: Musiker, Kunstmaler, etc.; Parsons:
counted only if no other function or occupation is given; Officials of social-cultural
organizations: representatives of, e.g., Pfadjnder, Deutscher Frauen-Kampfbund, Wandervogel;
Nobility: counted only above the level of von, and when no other function or occupation is
listed; Socialites: Winifried Wagner, Eva Chamberlain, Daniela Thode; Widows and Pensioners: includes those explicitly listed as such, plus men listing military ranks a.D. without
additional indication of occupation.

